mirror of
https://github.com/unraid/api.git
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feat: initial codeql setup (#1390)
This commit is contained in:
49
.github/codeql/README.md
vendored
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49
.github/codeql/README.md
vendored
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@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
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# CodeQL Security Analysis for Unraid API
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This directory contains custom CodeQL queries and configurations for security analysis of the Unraid API codebase.
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## Overview
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The analysis is configured to run:
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- On all pushes to the main branch
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- On all pull requests
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- Weekly via scheduled runs
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## Custom Queries
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The following custom queries are implemented:
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1. **API Authorization Bypass Detection**
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Identifies API handlers that may not properly check authorization before performing operations.
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2. **GraphQL Injection Detection**
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Detects potential injection vulnerabilities in GraphQL queries and operations.
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3. **Hardcoded Secrets Detection**
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Finds potential hardcoded secrets or credentials in the codebase.
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4. **Insecure Cryptographic Implementations**
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Identifies usage of weak cryptographic algorithms or insecure random number generation.
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5. **Path Traversal Vulnerability Detection**
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Detects potential path traversal vulnerabilities in file system operations.
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## Configuration
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The CodeQL analysis is configured in:
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- `.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml` - Workflow configuration
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- `.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml` - CodeQL engine configuration
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## Running Locally
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To run these queries locally:
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1. Install the CodeQL CLI: https://github.com/github/codeql-cli-binaries/releases
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2. Create a CodeQL database:
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```
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codeql database create <db-name> --language=javascript --source-root=.
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```
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3. Run a query:
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```
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codeql query run .github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/api-auth-bypass.ql --database=<db-name>
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```
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16
.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
vendored
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16
.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
vendored
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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name: "Unraid API CodeQL Configuration"
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disable-default-queries: false
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queries:
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- name: Extended Security Queries
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uses: security-extended
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- name: Custom Unraid API Queries
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uses: ./.github/codeql/custom-queries
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query-filters:
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- exclude:
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problem.severity:
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- warning
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- recommendation
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tags contain: security
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45
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/api-auth-bypass.ql
vendored
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45
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/api-auth-bypass.ql
vendored
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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
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/**
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* @name Potential API Authorization Bypass
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* @description Functions that process API requests without verifying authorization may lead to security vulnerabilities.
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* @kind problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @precision medium
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* @id js/api-auth-bypass
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-285
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*/
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import javascript
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/**
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* Identifies functions that appear to handle API requests
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*/
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predicate isApiHandler(Function f) {
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exists(f.getAParameter()) and
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(
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f.getName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(api|handler|controller|resolver|endpoint).*") or
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exists(CallExpr call |
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call.getCalleeName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(get|post|put|delete|patch).*") and
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call.getArgument(1) = f
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)
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)
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}
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/**
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* Identifies expressions that appear to perform authorization checks
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*/
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predicate isAuthCheck(DataFlow::Node node) {
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exists(CallExpr call |
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call.getCalleeName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(authorize|authenticate|isAuth|checkAuth|verifyAuth|hasPermission|isAdmin|canAccess).*") and
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call.flow().getASuccessor*() = node
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)
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}
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from Function apiHandler
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where
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isApiHandler(apiHandler) and
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not exists(DataFlow::Node authCheck |
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isAuthCheck(authCheck) and
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authCheck.getEnclosingExpr().getEnclosingFunction() = apiHandler
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)
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select apiHandler, "API handler function may not perform proper authorization checks."
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77
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/graphql-injection.ql
vendored
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77
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/graphql-injection.ql
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/**
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* @name Potential GraphQL Injection
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* @description User-controlled input used directly in GraphQL queries may lead to injection vulnerabilities.
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @precision high
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* @id js/graphql-injection
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-943
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*/
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import javascript
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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class GraphQLQueryExecution extends DataFlow::CallNode {
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GraphQLQueryExecution() {
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exists(string name |
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name = this.getCalleeName() and
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(
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name = "execute" or
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name = "executeQuery" or
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name = "query" or
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name.regexpMatch("(?i).*graphql.*query.*")
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)
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)
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}
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DataFlow::Node getQuery() {
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result = this.getArgument(0)
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}
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}
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class UserControlledInput extends DataFlow::Node {
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UserControlledInput() {
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exists(DataFlow::ParameterNode param |
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param.getName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(query|request|input|args|variables|params).*") and
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this = param
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)
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or
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exists(DataFlow::PropRead prop |
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prop.getPropertyName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(query|request|input|args|variables|params).*") and
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this = prop
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* Holds if `node` is a string concatenation.
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*/
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predicate isStringConcatenation(DataFlow::Node node) {
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exists(BinaryExpr concat |
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concat.getOperator() = "+" and
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concat.flow() = node
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)
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}
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class GraphQLInjectionConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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GraphQLInjectionConfig() { this = "GraphQLInjectionConfig" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
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source instanceof UserControlledInput
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}
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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exists(GraphQLQueryExecution exec | sink = exec.getQuery())
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}
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override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
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// Add any GraphQL-specific taint steps if needed
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isStringConcatenation(succ) and
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succ.(DataFlow::BinaryExprNode).getAnOperand() = pred
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}
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}
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from GraphQLInjectionConfig config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
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where config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
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select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "GraphQL query may contain user-controlled input from $@.", source.getNode(), "user input"
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53
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/hardcoded-secrets.ql
vendored
Normal file
53
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/hardcoded-secrets.ql
vendored
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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
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/**
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* @name Hardcoded Secrets
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* @description Hardcoded secrets or credentials in source code can lead to security vulnerabilities.
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* @kind problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @precision medium
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* @id js/hardcoded-secrets
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-798
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*/
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import javascript
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/**
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* Identifies variable declarations or assignments that may contain secrets
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*/
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predicate isSensitiveAssignment(DataFlow::Node node) {
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exists(DataFlow::PropWrite propWrite |
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propWrite.getPropertyName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(secret|key|password|token|credential|auth).*") and
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propWrite.getRhs() = node
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)
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or
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exists(VariableDeclarator decl |
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decl.getName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(secret|key|password|token|credential|auth).*") and
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decl.getInit().flow() = node
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)
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}
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/**
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* Identifies literals that look like secrets
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*/
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predicate isSecretLiteral(StringLiteral literal) {
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// Match alphanumeric strings of moderate length that may be secrets
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literal.getValue().regexpMatch("[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{8,}") and
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not (
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// Skip likely non-sensitive literals
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literal.getValue().regexpMatch("(?i)^(true|false|null|undefined|localhost|development|production|staging)$") or
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// Skip URLs without credentials
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literal.getValue().regexpMatch("^https?://[^:@/]+")
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)
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}
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from DataFlow::Node source
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where
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isSensitiveAssignment(source) and
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(
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exists(StringLiteral literal |
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literal.flow() = source and
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isSecretLiteral(literal)
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)
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)
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select source, "This assignment may contain a hardcoded secret or credential."
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90
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/insecure-crypto.ql
vendored
Normal file
90
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/insecure-crypto.ql
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
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/**
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* @name Insecure Cryptographic Implementation
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* @description Usage of weak cryptographic algorithms or improper implementations can lead to security vulnerabilities.
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* @kind problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @precision high
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* @id js/insecure-crypto
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-327
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*/
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import javascript
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/**
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* Identifies calls to crypto functions with insecure algorithms
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*/
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predicate isInsecureCryptoCall(CallExpr call) {
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// Node.js crypto module uses
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exists(string methodName |
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methodName = call.getCalleeName() and
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(
|
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// Detect MD5 usage
|
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methodName.regexpMatch("(?i).*md5.*") or
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methodName.regexpMatch("(?i).*sha1.*") or
|
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|
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// Insecure crypto constructors
|
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(
|
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methodName = "createHash" or
|
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methodName = "createCipheriv" or
|
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methodName = "createDecipher"
|
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) and
|
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(
|
||||
exists(StringLiteral algo |
|
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algo = call.getArgument(0) and
|
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(
|
||||
algo.getValue().regexpMatch("(?i).*(md5|md4|md2|sha1|des|rc4|blowfish).*") or
|
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algo.getValue().regexpMatch("(?i).*(ecb).*") // ECB mode
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
or
|
||||
// Browser crypto API uses
|
||||
exists(MethodCallExpr mce, string propertyName |
|
||||
propertyName = mce.getMethodName() and
|
||||
(
|
||||
propertyName = "subtle" and
|
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exists(MethodCallExpr subtleCall |
|
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subtleCall.getReceiver() = mce and
|
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subtleCall.getMethodName() = "encrypt" and
|
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exists(ObjectExpr obj |
|
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obj = subtleCall.getArgument(0) and
|
||||
exists(Property p |
|
||||
p = obj.getAProperty() and
|
||||
p.getName() = "name" and
|
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exists(StringLiteral algo |
|
||||
algo = p.getInit() and
|
||||
algo.getValue().regexpMatch("(?i).*(rc4|des|aes-cbc).*")
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Identifies usage of Math.random() for security-sensitive operations
|
||||
*/
|
||||
predicate isInsecureRandomCall(CallExpr call) {
|
||||
exists(PropertyAccess prop |
|
||||
prop.getPropertyName() = "random" and
|
||||
prop.getBase().toString() = "Math" and
|
||||
call.getCallee() = prop
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
from Expr insecureExpr, string message
|
||||
where
|
||||
(
|
||||
insecureExpr instanceof CallExpr and
|
||||
isInsecureCryptoCall(insecureExpr) and
|
||||
message = "Using potentially insecure cryptographic algorithm or mode."
|
||||
) or (
|
||||
insecureExpr instanceof CallExpr and
|
||||
isInsecureRandomCall(insecureExpr) and
|
||||
message = "Using Math.random() for security-sensitive operation. Consider using crypto.getRandomValues() instead."
|
||||
)
|
||||
select insecureExpr, message
|
||||
130
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/path-traversal.ql
vendored
Normal file
130
.github/codeql/custom-queries/javascript/path-traversal.ql
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @name Path Traversal Vulnerability
|
||||
* @description User-controlled inputs used in file operations may allow for path traversal attacks.
|
||||
* @kind path-problem
|
||||
* @problem.severity error
|
||||
* @precision high
|
||||
* @id js/path-traversal
|
||||
* @tags security
|
||||
* external/cwe/cwe-22
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import javascript
|
||||
import DataFlow::PathGraph
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Identifies sources of user-controlled input
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class UserInput extends DataFlow::Node {
|
||||
UserInput() {
|
||||
// HTTP request parameters
|
||||
exists(DataFlow::ParameterNode param |
|
||||
param.getName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(req|request|param|query|body|user|input).*") and
|
||||
this = param
|
||||
)
|
||||
or
|
||||
// Access to common request properties
|
||||
exists(DataFlow::PropRead prop |
|
||||
(
|
||||
prop.getPropertyName() = "query" or
|
||||
prop.getPropertyName() = "body" or
|
||||
prop.getPropertyName() = "params" or
|
||||
prop.getPropertyName() = "files"
|
||||
) and
|
||||
this = prop
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Identifies fs module imports
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class FileSystemAccess extends DataFlow::CallNode {
|
||||
FileSystemAccess() {
|
||||
// Node.js fs module functions
|
||||
exists(string name |
|
||||
name = this.getCalleeName() and
|
||||
(
|
||||
name = "readFile" or
|
||||
name = "readFileSync" or
|
||||
name = "writeFile" or
|
||||
name = "writeFileSync" or
|
||||
name = "appendFile" or
|
||||
name = "appendFileSync" or
|
||||
name = "createReadStream" or
|
||||
name = "createWriteStream" or
|
||||
name = "openSync" or
|
||||
name = "open"
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
or
|
||||
// File system operations via require('fs')
|
||||
exists(DataFlow::SourceNode fsModule, string methodName |
|
||||
(fsModule.getAPropertyRead("promises") or fsModule).flowsTo(this.getReceiver()) and
|
||||
methodName = this.getMethodName() and
|
||||
(
|
||||
methodName = "readFile" or
|
||||
methodName = "writeFile" or
|
||||
methodName = "appendFile" or
|
||||
methodName = "readdir" or
|
||||
methodName = "stat"
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DataFlow::Node getPathArgument() {
|
||||
result = this.getArgument(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Identifies sanitization of file paths
|
||||
*/
|
||||
predicate isPathSanitized(DataFlow::Node node) {
|
||||
// Check for path normalization or validation
|
||||
exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
|
||||
(
|
||||
call.getCalleeName() = "resolve" or
|
||||
call.getCalleeName() = "normalize" or
|
||||
call.getCalleeName() = "isAbsolute" or
|
||||
call.getCalleeName() = "relative" or
|
||||
call.getCalleeName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(sanitize|validate|check).*path.*")
|
||||
) and
|
||||
call.flowsTo(node)
|
||||
)
|
||||
or
|
||||
// Check for path traversal mitigation patterns
|
||||
exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
|
||||
call.getCalleeName() = "replace" and
|
||||
exists(StringLiteral regex |
|
||||
regex = call.getArgument(0).(DataFlow::RegExpCreationNode).getSource().getAChildExpr() and
|
||||
regex.getValue().regexpMatch("(\\.\\./|\\.\\.\\\\)")
|
||||
) and
|
||||
call.flowsTo(node)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Configuration for tracking flow from user input to file system operations
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class PathTraversalConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
|
||||
PathTraversalConfig() { this = "PathTraversalConfig" }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
|
||||
source instanceof UserInput
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
|
||||
exists(FileSystemAccess fileAccess |
|
||||
sink = fileAccess.getPathArgument()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
|
||||
isPathSanitized(node)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
from PathTraversalConfig config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
|
||||
where config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
|
||||
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "File system operation depends on a user-controlled value $@.", source.getNode(), "user input"
|
||||
40
.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
vendored
Normal file
40
.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
name: "CodeQL Security Analysis"
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [ main ]
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
branches: [ main ]
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
- cron: '0 0 * * 0' # Run weekly on Sundays
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
analyze:
|
||||
name: Analyze
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
actions: read
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
security-events: write
|
||||
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
language: [ 'javascript', 'typescript' ]
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout repository
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Initialize CodeQL
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
|
||||
config-file: ./.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
|
||||
queries: +security-and-quality
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Autobuild
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v2
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user