Files
formbricks/apps/web/playwright/api/auth/security.spec.ts
2025-10-06 05:02:51 +00:00

490 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript

import { expect } from "@playwright/test";
import { logger } from "@formbricks/logger";
import { test } from "../../lib/fixtures";
// Authentication endpoints are hardcoded to avoid import issues
test.describe("Authentication Security Tests - Vulnerability Prevention", () => {
let csrfToken: string;
let testUser: { email: string; password: string };
test.beforeEach(async ({ request, users }) => {
// Get CSRF token for authentication requests
const csrfResponse = await request.get("/api/auth/csrf");
const csrfData = await csrfResponse.json();
csrfToken = csrfData.csrfToken;
// Create a test user for "existing user" scenarios with unique email
const uniqueId = Date.now() + Math.random();
const userName = "Security Test User";
const userEmail = `security-test-${uniqueId}@example.com`;
await users.create({
name: userName,
email: userEmail,
});
testUser = {
email: userEmail,
password: userName, // The fixture uses the name as password
};
});
test.describe("DoS Protection - Password Length Limits", () => {
test("should handle extremely long passwords without crashing", async ({ request }) => {
const email = "nonexistent-dos-test@example.com"; // Use non-existent email for DoS test
const extremelyLongPassword = "A".repeat(50000); // 50,000 characters
const start = Date.now();
const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: email,
password: extremelyLongPassword,
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
const responseTime = Date.now() - start;
// Should not crash the server (no 500 errors)
expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
// Should handle gracefully
expect([200, 400, 401, 429]).toContain(response.status());
logger.info(
`Extremely long password (50k chars) processing time: ${responseTime}ms, status: ${response.status()}`
);
// Verify the security fix is working: long passwords should be rejected quickly
// In production, this should be much faster, but test environment has overhead
if (responseTime < 5000) {
logger.info("✅ Long password rejected quickly - DoS protection working");
} else {
logger.warn("⚠️ Long password took longer than expected - check DoS protection");
}
});
test("should handle password at 128 character limit", async ({ request }) => {
const email = "nonexistent-limit-test@example.com"; // Use non-existent email for limit test
const maxLengthPassword = "A".repeat(128); // Exactly at the 128 character limit
const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: email,
password: maxLengthPassword,
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
// Should process normally (not rejected for length)
expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
expect([200, 400, 401, 429]).toContain(response.status());
logger.info(`Max length password (128 chars) status: ${response.status()}`);
});
test("should reject passwords over 128 characters", async ({ request }) => {
const email = "nonexistent-overlimit-test@example.com"; // Use non-existent email for over-limit test
const overLimitPassword = "A".repeat(10000); // 10,000 characters (over limit)
const start = Date.now();
const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: email,
password: overLimitPassword,
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
const responseTime = Date.now() - start;
// Should not crash
expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
logger.info(
`Over-limit password (10k chars) processing time: ${responseTime}ms, status: ${response.status()}`
);
// The key security test: verify it doesn't take exponentially longer than shorter passwords
// This tests the DoS protection is working
});
});
test.describe("Timing Attack Prevention - User Enumeration Protection", () => {
test("should not reveal user existence through response timing differences", async ({ request }) => {
// Helper functions for statistical analysis
const calculateMedian = (values: number[]): number => {
const sorted = [...values].sort((a, b) => a - b);
const mid = Math.floor(sorted.length / 2);
return sorted.length % 2 === 0 ? (sorted[mid - 1] + sorted[mid]) / 2 : sorted[mid];
};
const calculateStdDev = (values: number[], mean: number): number => {
const variance = values.reduce((sum, val) => sum + Math.pow(val - mean, 2), 0) / values.length;
return Math.sqrt(variance);
};
logger.info("🔥 Phase 1: Warming up caches, DB connections, and JIT compilation...");
// Warm-up phase: Prime caches, database connections, JIT compilation
const warmupAttempts = 10;
for (let i = 0; i < warmupAttempts; i++) {
await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: `warmup-nonexistent-${i}@example.com`,
password: "warmuppassword",
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: testUser.email,
password: "wrongwarmuppassword",
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
}
logger.info("✅ Warm-up complete. Starting actual measurements with 100 attempts per scenario...");
// Actual measurement phase with increased sample size
const attempts = 100;
const nonExistentTimes: number[] = [];
const existingUserTimes: number[] = [];
// Interleave tests to reduce impact of system load variations
for (let i = 0; i < attempts; i++) {
// Test non-existent user
const startNonExistent = process.hrtime.bigint();
const responseNonExistent = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: `nonexistent-timing-${i}@example.com`,
password: "somepassword",
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
const endNonExistent = process.hrtime.bigint();
const responseTimeNonExistent = Number(endNonExistent - startNonExistent) / 1000000;
nonExistentTimes.push(responseTimeNonExistent);
expect(responseNonExistent.status()).not.toBe(500);
// Test existing user (interleaved)
const startExisting = process.hrtime.bigint();
const responseExisting = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: testUser.email,
password: "wrongpassword123",
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
const endExisting = process.hrtime.bigint();
const responseTimeExisting = Number(endExisting - startExisting) / 1000000;
existingUserTimes.push(responseTimeExisting);
expect(responseExisting.status()).not.toBe(500);
}
// Calculate statistics using median (more robust to outliers)
const medianNonExistent = calculateMedian(nonExistentTimes);
const medianExisting = calculateMedian(existingUserTimes);
// Also calculate means for comparison
const avgNonExistent = nonExistentTimes.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0) / nonExistentTimes.length;
const avgExisting = existingUserTimes.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0) / existingUserTimes.length;
// Calculate standard deviations
const stdDevNonExistent = calculateStdDev(nonExistentTimes, avgNonExistent);
const stdDevExisting = calculateStdDev(existingUserTimes, avgExisting);
// Calculate timing difference using MEDIAN (more reliable)
const timingDifference = Math.abs(medianExisting - medianNonExistent);
const timingDifferencePercent = (timingDifference / Math.max(medianExisting, medianNonExistent)) * 100;
// Calculate coefficient of variation (CV) for reliability assessment
// CV = (StdDev / Mean) * 100 - measures relative variability
const cvNonExistent = (stdDevNonExistent / avgNonExistent) * 100;
const cvExisting = (stdDevExisting / avgExisting) * 100;
// Log comprehensive statistics
logger.info("📊 Statistical Analysis:");
logger.info(
`Non-existent user - Mean: ${avgNonExistent.toFixed(2)}ms, Median: ${medianNonExistent.toFixed(2)}ms, StdDev: ${stdDevNonExistent.toFixed(2)}ms (CV: ${cvNonExistent.toFixed(1)}%)`
);
logger.info(
`Existing user - Mean: ${avgExisting.toFixed(2)}ms, Median: ${medianExisting.toFixed(2)}ms, StdDev: ${stdDevExisting.toFixed(2)}ms (CV: ${cvExisting.toFixed(1)}%)`
);
logger.info(
`Timing difference (median-based): ${timingDifference.toFixed(2)}ms (${timingDifferencePercent.toFixed(1)}%)`
);
// CRITICAL SECURITY TEST: Timing difference should be minimal
// A large timing difference could allow attackers to enumerate users
// Allow up to 20% difference to account for network/system variance
if (timingDifferencePercent > 20) {
logger.warn(
`⚠️ SECURITY RISK: Timing difference of ${timingDifferencePercent.toFixed(1)}% could allow user enumeration!`
);
logger.warn(`⚠️ Consider implementing constant-time authentication to prevent timing attacks`);
} else {
logger.info(
`✅ Timing attack protection: Only ${timingDifferencePercent.toFixed(1)}% difference between scenarios`
);
}
// Fail the test if timing difference exceeds our security threshold
// Note: This uses MEDIAN-based comparison (more robust to outliers than mean)
expect(timingDifferencePercent).toBeLessThan(20);
// Validate measurement reliability using coefficient of variation (CV)
// CV > 50% indicates high variability and unreliable measurements
const maxAcceptableCV = 50; // 50% is reasonable for network-based tests
if (cvNonExistent > maxAcceptableCV) {
logger.warn(
`⚠️ High variability in non-existent user timing (CV: ${cvNonExistent.toFixed(1)}%). ` +
`Test measurements may be unreliable. Consider increasing warm-up or checking CI environment.`
);
}
if (cvExisting > maxAcceptableCV) {
logger.warn(
`⚠️ High variability in existing user timing (CV: ${cvExisting.toFixed(1)}%). ` +
`Test measurements may be unreliable. Consider increasing warm-up or checking CI environment.`
);
}
// These are soft checks - we warn but don't fail the test for high CV
// This allows for noisy CI environments while still alerting to potential issues
if (cvNonExistent <= maxAcceptableCV && cvExisting <= maxAcceptableCV) {
logger.info(
`✅ Measurement reliability good: CV ${cvNonExistent.toFixed(1)}% and ${cvExisting.toFixed(1)}% (threshold: ${maxAcceptableCV}%)`
);
}
});
test("should return consistent status codes regardless of user existence", async ({ request }) => {
const scenarios = [
{
email: "nonexistent-status@example.com",
password: "testpassword",
description: "non-existent user",
},
{ email: testUser.email, password: "wrongpassword", description: "existing user, wrong password" },
];
const results: { scenario: string; status: number }[] = [];
for (const scenario of scenarios) {
const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: scenario.email,
password: scenario.password,
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
results.push({
scenario: scenario.description,
status: response.status(),
});
expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
}
// Log results
results.forEach(({ scenario, status }) => {
logger.info(`Status test - ${scenario}: ${status}`);
});
// CRITICAL: Both scenarios should return the same status code
// Different status codes could reveal user existence
const statuses = results.map((r) => r.status);
const uniqueStatuses = [...new Set(statuses)];
if (uniqueStatuses.length > 1) {
logger.warn(
`⚠️ SECURITY RISK: Different status codes (${uniqueStatuses.join(", ")}) could allow user enumeration!`
);
} else {
logger.info(`✅ Status code consistency: Both scenarios return ${statuses[0]}`);
}
expect(uniqueStatuses.length).toBe(1);
});
});
test.describe("Security Headers and Response Safety", () => {
test("should include security headers in responses", async ({ request }) => {
const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: "nonexistent-headers-test@example.com",
password: "testpassword",
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
// Check for important security headers
const headers = response.headers();
// These headers should be present for security
expect(headers["x-frame-options"]).toBeDefined();
expect(headers["x-content-type-options"]).toBe("nosniff");
if (headers["strict-transport-security"]) {
expect(headers["strict-transport-security"]).toContain("max-age");
}
if (headers["content-security-policy"]) {
expect(headers["content-security-policy"]).toContain("default-src");
}
logger.info("✅ Security headers present in authentication responses");
});
test("should not expose sensitive information in error responses", async ({ request }) => {
const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: "nonexistent-disclosure-test@example.com",
password: "A".repeat(10000), // Trigger long password handling
redirect: "false",
csrfToken: csrfToken,
json: "true",
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
const responseBody = await response.text();
// Log the actual response for debugging
logger.info(`Response status: ${response.status()}`);
logger.info(`Response body (first 500 chars): ${responseBody.substring(0, 500)}`);
// Check if this is an HTML response (which indicates NextAuth.js is returning a page instead of API response)
const isHtmlResponse =
responseBody.trim().startsWith("<!DOCTYPE html>") || responseBody.includes("<html");
if (isHtmlResponse) {
logger.info(
"✅ NextAuth.js returned HTML page instead of API response - this is expected behavior for security"
);
logger.info("✅ No sensitive technical information exposed in authentication API");
return; // Skip the sensitive information check for HTML responses
}
// Only check for sensitive information in actual API responses (JSON/text)
const sensitiveTerms = [
"password_too_long",
"bcrypt",
"hash",
"redis",
"database",
"prisma",
"stack trace",
"rate limit exceeded",
"authentication failed",
"sql",
"query",
"connection timeout",
"internal error",
];
let foundSensitiveInfo = false;
const foundTerms: string[] = [];
for (const term of sensitiveTerms) {
if (responseBody.toLowerCase().includes(term.toLowerCase())) {
foundSensitiveInfo = true;
foundTerms.push(term);
logger.warn(`Found "${term}" in response`);
}
}
if (foundSensitiveInfo) {
logger.warn(`⚠️ Found sensitive information in response: ${foundTerms.join(", ")}`);
logger.warn(`Full response body: ${responseBody}`);
} else {
logger.info("✅ No sensitive technical information exposed in error responses");
}
// Don't fail the test for generic web responses, only for actual security leaks
expect(foundSensitiveInfo).toBe(false);
});
test("should handle malformed requests gracefully", async ({ request }) => {
// Test with missing CSRF token
const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
data: {
callbackUrl: "",
email: "nonexistent-malformed-test@example.com",
password: "testpassword",
redirect: "false",
json: "true",
// Missing csrfToken
},
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
});
// Should handle gracefully, not crash
expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
expect([200, 400, 401, 403, 429]).toContain(response.status());
logger.info(`✅ Malformed request handled gracefully: status ${response.status()}`);
});
});
});