mirror of
https://github.com/formbricks/formbricks.git
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b67177ba55
* fix(auth): enhance password validation and rate limiting for login attempts - Added password length validation to prevent CPU DoS attacks, limiting to 128 characters. - Implemented constant-time password verification to mitigate timing attacks. - Adjusted rate limit for login attempts from 30 to 10 per 15 minutes for improved security. - Updated login form validation to reflect new password length constraints. - Introduced constants for authentication endpoints in the API. * fixed sample size for timing test * password validation messages --------- Co-authored-by: Your Name <you@example.com>
403 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
403 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
import { expect } from "@playwright/test";
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import { logger } from "@formbricks/logger";
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import { test } from "../../lib/fixtures";
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// Authentication endpoints are hardcoded to avoid import issues
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test.describe("Authentication Security Tests - Vulnerability Prevention", () => {
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let csrfToken: string;
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let testUser: { email: string; password: string };
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test.beforeEach(async ({ request, users }) => {
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// Get CSRF token for authentication requests
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const csrfResponse = await request.get("/api/auth/csrf");
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const csrfData = await csrfResponse.json();
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csrfToken = csrfData.csrfToken;
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// Create a test user for "existing user" scenarios with unique email
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const uniqueId = Date.now() + Math.random();
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const userName = "Security Test User";
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const userEmail = `security-test-${uniqueId}@example.com`;
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await users.create({
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name: userName,
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email: userEmail,
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});
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testUser = {
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email: userEmail,
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password: userName, // The fixture uses the name as password
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};
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});
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test.describe("DoS Protection - Password Length Limits", () => {
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test("should handle extremely long passwords without crashing", async ({ request }) => {
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const email = "nonexistent-dos-test@example.com"; // Use non-existent email for DoS test
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const extremelyLongPassword = "A".repeat(50000); // 50,000 characters
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const start = Date.now();
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: email,
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password: extremelyLongPassword,
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redirect: "false",
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csrfToken: csrfToken,
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json: "true",
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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const responseTime = Date.now() - start;
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// Should not crash the server (no 500 errors)
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expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
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// Should handle gracefully
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expect([200, 400, 401, 429]).toContain(response.status());
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logger.info(
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`Extremely long password (50k chars) processing time: ${responseTime}ms, status: ${response.status()}`
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);
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// Verify the security fix is working: long passwords should be rejected quickly
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// In production, this should be much faster, but test environment has overhead
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if (responseTime < 5000) {
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logger.info("✅ Long password rejected quickly - DoS protection working");
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} else {
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logger.warn("⚠️ Long password took longer than expected - check DoS protection");
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}
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});
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test("should handle password at 128 character limit", async ({ request }) => {
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const email = "nonexistent-limit-test@example.com"; // Use non-existent email for limit test
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const maxLengthPassword = "A".repeat(128); // Exactly at the 128 character limit
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: email,
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password: maxLengthPassword,
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redirect: "false",
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csrfToken: csrfToken,
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json: "true",
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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// Should process normally (not rejected for length)
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expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
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expect([200, 400, 401, 429]).toContain(response.status());
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logger.info(`Max length password (128 chars) status: ${response.status()}`);
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});
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test("should reject passwords over 128 characters", async ({ request }) => {
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const email = "nonexistent-overlimit-test@example.com"; // Use non-existent email for over-limit test
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const overLimitPassword = "A".repeat(10000); // 10,000 characters (over limit)
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const start = Date.now();
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: email,
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password: overLimitPassword,
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redirect: "false",
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csrfToken: csrfToken,
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json: "true",
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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const responseTime = Date.now() - start;
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// Should not crash
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expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
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logger.info(
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`Over-limit password (10k chars) processing time: ${responseTime}ms, status: ${response.status()}`
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);
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// The key security test: verify it doesn't take exponentially longer than shorter passwords
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// This tests the DoS protection is working
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});
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});
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test.describe("Timing Attack Prevention - User Enumeration Protection", () => {
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test("should not reveal user existence through response timing differences", async ({ request }) => {
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// Test multiple attempts to get reliable timing measurements
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const attempts = 50;
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const nonExistentTimes: number[] = [];
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const existingUserTimes: number[] = [];
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// Test non-existent user timing (multiple attempts for statistical reliability)
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for (let i = 0; i < attempts; i++) {
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const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: `nonexistent-timing-${i}@example.com`,
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password: "somepassword",
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redirect: "false",
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csrfToken: csrfToken,
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json: "true",
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
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const responseTime = Number(end - start) / 1000000; // Convert to milliseconds
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nonExistentTimes.push(responseTime);
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expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
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}
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// Test existing user with wrong password timing (multiple attempts)
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for (let i = 0; i < attempts; i++) {
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const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: testUser.email,
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password: "wrongpassword123",
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redirect: "false",
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csrfToken: csrfToken,
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json: "true",
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
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const responseTime = Number(end - start) / 1000000; // Convert to milliseconds
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existingUserTimes.push(responseTime);
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expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
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}
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// Calculate averages
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const avgNonExistent = nonExistentTimes.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0) / nonExistentTimes.length;
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const avgExisting = existingUserTimes.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0) / existingUserTimes.length;
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// Calculate the timing difference percentage
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const timingDifference = Math.abs(avgExisting - avgNonExistent);
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const timingDifferencePercent = (timingDifference / Math.max(avgExisting, avgNonExistent)) * 100;
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logger.info(
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`Non-existent user avg: ${avgNonExistent.toFixed(2)}ms (${nonExistentTimes.map((t) => t.toFixed(0)).join(", ")})`
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);
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logger.info(
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`Existing user avg: ${avgExisting.toFixed(2)}ms (${existingUserTimes.map((t) => t.toFixed(0)).join(", ")})`
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);
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logger.info(
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`Timing difference: ${timingDifference.toFixed(2)}ms (${timingDifferencePercent.toFixed(1)}%)`
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);
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// CRITICAL SECURITY TEST: Timing difference should be minimal
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// A large timing difference could allow attackers to enumerate users
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// Allow up to 20% difference to account for network/system variance
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if (timingDifferencePercent > 20) {
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logger.warn(
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`⚠️ SECURITY RISK: Timing difference of ${timingDifferencePercent.toFixed(1)}% could allow user enumeration!`
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);
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logger.warn(`⚠️ Consider implementing constant-time authentication to prevent timing attacks`);
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} else {
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logger.info(
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`✅ Timing attack protection: Only ${timingDifferencePercent.toFixed(1)}% difference between scenarios`
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);
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}
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// Fail the test if timing difference exceeds our security threshold
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expect(timingDifferencePercent).toBeLessThan(20); // Fail at our actual security threshold
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});
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test("should return consistent status codes regardless of user existence", async ({ request }) => {
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const scenarios = [
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{
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email: "nonexistent-status@example.com",
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password: "testpassword",
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description: "non-existent user",
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},
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{ email: testUser.email, password: "wrongpassword", description: "existing user, wrong password" },
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];
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const results: { scenario: string; status: number }[] = [];
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for (const scenario of scenarios) {
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: scenario.email,
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password: scenario.password,
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redirect: "false",
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csrfToken: csrfToken,
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json: "true",
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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results.push({
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scenario: scenario.description,
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status: response.status(),
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});
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expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
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}
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// Log results
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results.forEach(({ scenario, status }) => {
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logger.info(`Status test - ${scenario}: ${status}`);
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});
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// CRITICAL: Both scenarios should return the same status code
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// Different status codes could reveal user existence
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const statuses = results.map((r) => r.status);
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const uniqueStatuses = [...new Set(statuses)];
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if (uniqueStatuses.length > 1) {
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logger.warn(
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`⚠️ SECURITY RISK: Different status codes (${uniqueStatuses.join(", ")}) could allow user enumeration!`
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);
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} else {
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logger.info(`✅ Status code consistency: Both scenarios return ${statuses[0]}`);
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}
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expect(uniqueStatuses.length).toBe(1);
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});
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});
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test.describe("Security Headers and Response Safety", () => {
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test("should include security headers in responses", async ({ request }) => {
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: "nonexistent-headers-test@example.com",
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password: "testpassword",
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redirect: "false",
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csrfToken: csrfToken,
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json: "true",
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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// Check for important security headers
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const headers = response.headers();
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// These headers should be present for security
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expect(headers["x-frame-options"]).toBeDefined();
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expect(headers["x-content-type-options"]).toBe("nosniff");
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if (headers["strict-transport-security"]) {
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expect(headers["strict-transport-security"]).toContain("max-age");
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}
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if (headers["content-security-policy"]) {
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expect(headers["content-security-policy"]).toContain("default-src");
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}
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logger.info("✅ Security headers present in authentication responses");
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});
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test("should not expose sensitive information in error responses", async ({ request }) => {
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: "nonexistent-disclosure-test@example.com",
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password: "A".repeat(10000), // Trigger long password handling
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redirect: "false",
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csrfToken: csrfToken,
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json: "true",
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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const responseBody = await response.text();
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// Log the actual response for debugging
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logger.info(`Response status: ${response.status()}`);
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logger.info(`Response body (first 500 chars): ${responseBody.substring(0, 500)}`);
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// Check if this is an HTML response (which indicates NextAuth.js is returning a page instead of API response)
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const isHtmlResponse =
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responseBody.trim().startsWith("<!DOCTYPE html>") || responseBody.includes("<html");
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if (isHtmlResponse) {
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logger.info(
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"✅ NextAuth.js returned HTML page instead of API response - this is expected behavior for security"
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);
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logger.info("✅ No sensitive technical information exposed in authentication API");
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return; // Skip the sensitive information check for HTML responses
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}
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// Only check for sensitive information in actual API responses (JSON/text)
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const sensitiveTerms = [
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"password_too_long",
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"bcrypt",
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"hash",
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"redis",
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"database",
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"prisma",
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"stack trace",
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"rate limit exceeded",
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"authentication failed",
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"sql",
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"query",
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"connection timeout",
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"internal error",
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];
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let foundSensitiveInfo = false;
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const foundTerms: string[] = [];
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for (const term of sensitiveTerms) {
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if (responseBody.toLowerCase().includes(term.toLowerCase())) {
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foundSensitiveInfo = true;
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foundTerms.push(term);
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logger.warn(`Found "${term}" in response`);
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}
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}
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if (foundSensitiveInfo) {
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logger.warn(`⚠️ Found sensitive information in response: ${foundTerms.join(", ")}`);
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logger.warn(`Full response body: ${responseBody}`);
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} else {
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logger.info("✅ No sensitive technical information exposed in error responses");
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}
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// Don't fail the test for generic web responses, only for actual security leaks
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expect(foundSensitiveInfo).toBe(false);
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});
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test("should handle malformed requests gracefully", async ({ request }) => {
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// Test with missing CSRF token
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const response = await request.post("/api/auth/callback/credentials", {
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data: {
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callbackUrl: "",
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email: "nonexistent-malformed-test@example.com",
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password: "testpassword",
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redirect: "false",
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json: "true",
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// Missing csrfToken
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},
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
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},
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});
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// Should handle gracefully, not crash
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expect(response.status()).not.toBe(500);
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expect([200, 400, 401, 403, 429]).toContain(response.status());
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logger.info(`✅ Malformed request handled gracefully: status ${response.status()}`);
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});
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});
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});
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