mirror of
https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet.git
synced 2026-04-21 00:59:50 -05:00
058968c06b
* fix: add type override in sqlc.yaml * chore: gen sqlc * chore: big find and replace * chore: more * fix: clean up bunch of outdated `.Valid` refs * refactor: remove `sqlchelpers.uuidFromStr()` in favor of `uuid.MustParse()` * refactor: remove uuidToStr * fix: lint * fix: use pointers for null uuids * chore: clean up more null pointers * chore: clean up a bunch more * fix: couple more * fix: some types on the api * fix: incorrectly non-null param * fix: more nullable params * fix: more refs * refactor: start replacing tenant id strings with uuids * refactor: more tenant id uuid casting * refactor: fix a bunch more * refactor: more * refactor: more * refactor: is that all of them?! * fix: panic * fix: rm scans * fix: unwind some broken things * chore: tests * fix: rebase issues * fix: more tests * fix: nil checks * Refactor: Make all UUIDs into `uuid.UUID` (#2897) * refactor: remove a bunch more string uuids * refactor: pointers and lists * refactor: fix all the refs * refactor: fix a few more * fix: config loader * fix: revert some changes * fix: tests * fix: test * chore: proto * fix: durable listener * fix: some more string types * fix: python health worker sleep * fix: remove a bunch of `MustParse`s from the various gRPC servers * fix: rm more uuid.MustParse calls * fix: rm mustparse from api * fix: test * fix: merge issues * fix: handle a bunch more uses of `MustParse` everywhere * fix: nil id for worker label * fix: more casting in the oss * fix: more id parsing * fix: stringify jwt opt * fix: couple more bugs in untyped calls * fix: more types * fix: broken test * refactor: implement `GetKeyUuid` * chore: regen sqlc * chore: replace pgtype.UUID again * fix: bunch more type errors * fix: panic
204 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
204 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
package authz
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
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"github.com/rs/zerolog"
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"github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/api/v1/server/middleware"
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"github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/pkg/config/server"
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"github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/pkg/repository/sqlcv1"
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)
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type AuthZ struct {
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config *server.ServerConfig
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l *zerolog.Logger
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}
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func NewAuthZ(config *server.ServerConfig) *AuthZ {
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return &AuthZ{
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config: config,
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l: config.Logger,
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}
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}
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func (a *AuthZ) Middleware(r *middleware.RouteInfo) echo.HandlerFunc {
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return func(c echo.Context) error {
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err := a.authorize(c, r)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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}
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func (a *AuthZ) authorize(c echo.Context, r *middleware.RouteInfo) error {
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if r.Security.IsOptional() || r.Security.NoAuth() {
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return nil
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}
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var err error
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switch c.Get("auth_strategy").(string) {
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case "cookie":
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err = a.handleCookieAuth(c, r)
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case "bearer":
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err = a.handleBearerAuth(c, r)
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case "custom":
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err = a.handleCustomAuth(c, r)
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default:
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return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "No authorization strategy was checked")
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}
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return err
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}
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func (a *AuthZ) handleCookieAuth(c echo.Context, r *middleware.RouteInfo) error {
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unauthorized := echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "Not authorized to view this resource")
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if err := a.ensureVerifiedEmail(c, r); err != nil {
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a.l.Debug().Err(err).Msgf("error ensuring verified email")
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return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "Please verify your email before continuing")
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}
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// if tenant is set in the context, verify that the user is a member of the tenant
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if tenant, ok := c.Get("tenant").(*sqlcv1.Tenant); ok {
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user, ok := c.Get("user").(*sqlcv1.User)
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if !ok {
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a.l.Debug().Msgf("user not found in context")
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return unauthorized
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}
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// check if the user is a member of the tenant
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tenantMember, err := a.config.V1.Tenant().GetTenantMemberByUserID(c.Request().Context(), tenant.ID, user.ID)
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if err != nil {
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a.l.Debug().Err(err).Msgf("error getting tenant member")
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return unauthorized
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}
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if tenantMember == nil {
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a.l.Debug().Msgf("user is not a member of the tenant")
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return unauthorized
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}
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// set the tenant member in the context
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c.Set("tenant-member", tenantMember)
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// authorize tenant operations
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if err := a.authorizeTenantOperations(tenant, tenantMember, r); err != nil {
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a.l.Debug().Err(err).Msgf("error authorizing tenant operations")
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return unauthorized
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}
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}
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if a.config.Auth.CustomAuthenticator != nil {
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return a.config.Auth.CustomAuthenticator.CookieAuthorizerHook(c, r)
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}
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return nil
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}
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var restrictedWithBearerToken = []string{
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// bearer tokens cannot read, list, or write other bearer tokens
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"ApiTokenList",
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"ApiTokenCreate",
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"ApiTokenUpdateRevoke",
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}
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// At the moment, there's no further bearer auth because bearer tokens are admin-scoped
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// and we check that the bearer token has access to the tenant in the authn step.
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func (a *AuthZ) handleBearerAuth(c echo.Context, r *middleware.RouteInfo) error {
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if operationIn(r.OperationID, restrictedWithBearerToken) {
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return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "Not authorized to perform this operation")
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (a *AuthZ) handleCustomAuth(c echo.Context, r *middleware.RouteInfo) error {
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if a.config.Auth.CustomAuthenticator == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("custom auth handler is not set")
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}
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return a.config.Auth.CustomAuthenticator.Authorize(c, r)
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}
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var permittedWithUnverifiedEmail = []string{
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"UserGetCurrent",
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"UserUpdateLogout",
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}
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func (a *AuthZ) ensureVerifiedEmail(c echo.Context, r *middleware.RouteInfo) error {
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user, ok := c.Get("user").(*sqlcv1.User)
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if !ok {
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return nil
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}
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if operationIn(r.OperationID, permittedWithUnverifiedEmail) {
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return nil
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}
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if !user.EmailVerified {
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return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "Please verify your email before continuing")
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}
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return nil
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}
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var adminAndOwnerOnly = []string{
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"TenantInviteList",
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"TenantInviteCreate",
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"TenantInviteUpdate",
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"TenantInviteDelete",
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"TenantMemberList",
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"TenantMemberUpdate",
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// members cannot create API tokens for a tenant, because they have admin permissions
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"ApiTokenList",
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"ApiTokenCreate",
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"ApiTokenUpdateRevoke",
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}
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func (a *AuthZ) authorizeTenantOperations(tenant *sqlcv1.Tenant, tenantMember *sqlcv1.PopulateTenantMembersRow, r *middleware.RouteInfo) error {
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// if the user is an owner, they can do anything
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if tenantMember.Role == sqlcv1.TenantMemberRoleOWNER {
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return nil
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}
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// if the user is an admin, they can do anything at the moment. Some downstream handlers will case on
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// admin roles, for example admins cannot mark users as owners.
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if tenantMember.Role == sqlcv1.TenantMemberRoleADMIN {
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return nil
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}
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// at the moment, tenant members are only restricted from creating other tenant users.
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if operationIn(r.OperationID, adminAndOwnerOnly) {
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return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "Not authorized to perform this operation")
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}
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// NOTE(abelanger5): this should be default-deny, but there's not a strong use-case for restricting member
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// operations at the moment. If there is, we should modify this logic.
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return nil
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}
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func operationIn(operationId string, operationIds []string) bool {
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for _, id := range operationIds {
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if strings.EqualFold(operationId, id) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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