* use min tls 1.2
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* add changelog
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
TLS for the services can be configure by setting the "OCIS_HTTP_TLS_ENABLED",
"OCIS_HTTP_TLS_CERTIFICATE" and "OCIS_HTTP_TLS_KEY" environment variables.
Currently the ocis proxy is this only service that directly accesses backend
services. It determines whether to use TLS or not by looking a the new registry
metadata "use_tls". As specific CA Cert for certificate verification
can be set with the "PROXY_HTTPS_CACERT" environment variable.
* Introduce TLS Settings for go-micro based grpc services and clients
TLS for the services can be configure by setting the OCIS_MICRO_GRPC_TLS_ENABLED"
"OCIS_MICRO_GRPC_TLS_CERTIFICATE" and "OCIS_MICRO_GRPC_TLS_KEY"
enviroment variables.
TLS for the clients can configured by setting the "OCIS_MICRO_GRPC_CLIENT_TLS_MODE"
and "OCIS_MICRO_GRPC_CLIENT_TLS_CACERT" variables.
By default TLS is disabled.
Co-authored-by: Martin <github@diemattels.at>
* Unify TLS configuration for all grpc services
All grpc service (whether they're based on reva) or go-micro use the
same set of config vars now.
TLS for the services can be configure by setting the OCIS_GRPC_TLS_ENABLED,
OCIS_GRPC_TLS_CERTIFICATE and OCIS_GRPC_TLS_KEY enviroment variables.
TLS for the clients can configured by setting the OCIS_GRPC_CLIENT_TLS_MODE
and OCIS_MICRO_GRPC_CLIENT_TLS_CACERT variables.
There are no individual per service config vars currently. If really
needed, per service tls configurations can be specified via config file.
Co-authored-by: Martin <github@diemattels.at>
Co-authored-by: Martin <github@diemattels.at>
This avoids using a public global variable. It allows us to initialize
the default client a bit later (outside of init()). That way we can e.g.
properly initialize the in-memory registry.
I refactored the proxy so that we execute the routing before the
authentication middleware. This is necessary so that we can determine
which routes are considered unprotected i.e. which routes don't need
authentication.
The old approach of the authentication middlewares had the problem that when an authenticator could not authenticate a request it would still send it to the next handler, in case that the next one can authenticate it. But if no authenticator could successfully authenticate the request, it would still be handled, which leads to unauthorized access.
Allow to switch jwt access token verification and off. Many (most?) IDP
provide JWT encoded access tokens. If ocis is configure to assume jwt
access tokens (access_token_verify_method==jwt) we now properly verify
the tokens signature and a set of standard claims ("exp", "iat" and nbf"
by way of the jwt module's standard verification and "iss" explicitliy).
This change also allows for introduction of other access token verification
mechanism in the future (e.g. through introspection (RFC7662).
The help flag is configured automatically by default already. We don't
need to redo that for every single service.
This also addresses one of the finding of "go race" (#4088)
